Accountability on the Move. The Parliament of Angola by Amundsen, Inge et al.
CMIWorkIngPAPEr
Accountability on the Move
The Parliament of Angola
Inge Amundsen
Cesaltina Abreu
Laurinda Hoygaard
WP 2005: 11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accountability on the Move 
The Parliament of Angola 
 
 
Inge Amundsen 
Cesaltina Abreu 
Laurinda Hoygaard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WP 2005: 11 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CMI Working Papers 
This series can be ordered from: 
Chr. Michelsen Institute 
P.O. Box 6033 Postterminalen, 
N-5892 Bergen, Norway 
Tel: + 47 55 57 40 00 
Fax: + 47 55 57 41 66 
E-mail: cmi@cmi.no 
www.cmi.no 
 
Price: NOK 50 
 
ISSN 0805-505X 
ISBN 82-8062-121-0 
This report is also available at: 
www.cmi.no/publications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indexing terms 
Democratization 
Parliament 
Constitutions 
Political parties 
Angola 
 
 
Project title 
Good Governance in Angola: Parliamentary Accountability and Control 
 
 
Project number 
22062 
 
  iii 
Contents 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................1 
1.1 HISTORY OF THE ANGOLAN PARLIAMENT .....................................................................................................1 
1.2 THE ANALYSIS....................................................................................................................................................2 
1.3 THE METHODOLOGY..........................................................................................................................................3 
2 REGULATION OF PARLIAMENTARY AUTHORITY.............................................................................4 
2.1 PRESIDENTIALISM IN ANGOLA.........................................................................................................................4 
2.2 LAWS REGULATING THE PARLIAMENT ...........................................................................................................7 
2.3 PARLIAMENTARY POWERS: THE LAW MAKING PROCESS ..............................................................................7 
2.4 PARLIAMENTARY POWERS: THE BUDGET PROCESS .......................................................................................8 
2.5 PARLIAMENTARY POWERS: OTHER MEANS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL ..................................10 
2.6 INFORMAL POWERS..........................................................................................................................................11 
3 ORGANISATIONAL SET-UP........................................................................................................................... 13 
3.1 FINANCING THE PARLIAMENT........................................................................................................................13 
3.2 ORGANISING THE PARLIAMENT : PRESIDENCY AND COMMITTEES............................................................13 
3.3 ORGANISING THE PARLIAMENT : PARTY GROUPS AND INDEPENDENTS....................................................15 
3.4 MP BACKGROUND AND REPRESENTATIVITY................................................................................................16 
3.5 ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT ............................................................................................................................16 
3.6 TECHNICAL FACILITIES, OFFICES, INFRASTRUCTURE, RESEARCH, TRAVEL, ETC....................................17 
4 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................................................... 17 
REFERENCES....................................................................................................................................................................20 
 
 
APPENDIX A....................................................................................................................................................................21 
APPENDIX B.....................................................................................................................................................................22 
 
 
CMI WORKING PAPER ACCOUNTABILITY ON THE MOVE WP 2005: 11 
 1 
1 Introduction1 
According to the constitution, Angola is a multiparty democracy, with power separated between the 
executive branch (the President), the legislative branch (the National Assembly or Parliament), and 
the judiciary. The Assembleia Nacional da República de Angola  (National Assembly of the 
Republic of Angola) is a 220 member unicameral national assembly, with 12 political parties 
represented.  
 
At the same time, Angola is a presidential system to an extreme degree. There is little to no 
Supreme Court influence on the government, and the Parliament has a very weak mandate, it has 
relatively little autonomy and it has a weak institutional capacity. Besides, the electoral system, the 
current party constellation, and the political culture are factors rendering support to presidentialism 
in Angola. 
1.1 History of the Angolan Parliament 
The history of the Angolan Parliament is quite short. Prior to the establishment of the National 
Assembly in 1991-92, there was a very passive ‘Peoples’ Assembly’, passive because it operated in 
a single-party system and was subjected to the dominance of the single ruling communist party 
MPLA, which placed itself above all state institutions. The political role of this People’s Assembly 
was completely overshadowed by the MPLA Party Congress, Central Committee and Political 
Bureau, and indeed – the President of the Republic (who was also the MPLA President). 
 
The Angolan Parliament was established through constitutional changes in 1991, which made it into 
a multiparty parliament (a National Assembly), and it was elected in September 1992. The 
democratic reforms of 1991-92 came after the end of the cold war, after MPLA formally abandoned 
Marxism-Leninism at its third congress in late 1990, and coincided with the negotiated Angolan 
peace accords at Bicesse of May 1991. 
 
The Bicesse peace accords temporarily settled the 15 years civil war in Angola, a civil war with 
international links, opposing (mainly) the ruling communist MPLA government (underpinned by 
Cuban soldiers, and with the Soviet Union in the back) with the opposition UNITA (supported by 
apartheid South Africa with the USA in the back). The political reforms were a part of the peace 
process in Angola, and coincided also with similar democratic developments in a number of other 
African countries. The watershed elections in 1992 brought Angola formally from a (communist) 
single party rule to a democratic, multiparty political system. 
 
The political reforms included two constitutional revisions, new laws on associations, the press and 
political parties, and lead to the establishment of a number of new organisations, independent 
newspapers, radio stations and political parties.  
 
However, with the quick resurgence to civil war in 1992 (which lasted to 1994), the majority of the 
deputies elected from the second largest party UNITA did not take up their seats until 1997, five 
years after their election, when a new agreement between the belligerents formed a Government of 
                                                 
1 This CMI Working Paper is one of the publications of a NORAD funded institutional research agreement 
between CMI, Bergen Norway, and A-IP, Angola Instituto de Pesquisa Económico e Social, Luanda, Angola . 
Inge Amundsen is a political scientist and senior researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway. 
Cesaltina Abreu is a sociologist and researcher at A-IP. Laurinda Hoygaard is an economist and lecturer at the 
Universidade Lusíada, Luanda, Angola. 
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National Unity, GURN, which also included UNITA members. From its election in 1992 until 
1997, the reformed Parliament therefore worked almost as under the Peoples’ Congress period, 
totally dominated by the MPLA. The parliamentary process was again interrupted by a second war 
period from late 1998 to early 2002. 
 
In November 1996, the Parliament extended its term ‘for a minimum of two years to a maximum of 
four years’. From 2002 onwards, the lack of security, the returning of displaced persons, the 
existence of land mines etc. have precluded any new election, so the Angolan Parliament is 
consequently still operating on the basis of the 1992 elections plus this (self-made) mandate 
extension. The Angolan Parliament is therefore increasingly being regarded as having no formal 
mandate and to be operating without a legal basis.2 
 
The recent political history of Angola is thus one of political centralisation and recurring civil war, 
which has contributed little in terms of democratic traditions on which to build a democratic 
parliament. A political culture of conflict, of administrative secrecy and confidentiality, of 
clientelism and favouritism (including co-optations: the buying off of political rivals) has 
furthermore weakened the political basis for a democratic parliament.  
1.2 The analysis 
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the legislative power in Angola, to make an assessment 
of the political role of the Angolan Parliament in a post-conflict democratisation setting. We will 
analyse the development of the institution since the introduction of multipartyism and the first, 
constitutive parliamentary elections in 1992, in order to assess how the Parliament fulfils the ideal 
role of democratic accountability. 3  
 
The background for this study is the African political transitions of the early 1990s, which were 
expected to curb executive dominance and democratise the continent. In the course of the 1990s, 42 
of the 48 states in sub-Saharan Africa held multi-party elections, in many cases accompanied by the 
establishment or reform of core state institutions like the parliament and the judiciary in order to 
guard against abuse of power. But despite widespread democratic reforms, executive dominance is 
                                                 
2 Already in 2001 did President dos Santos announce that new elections would be held in less than two years 
(and that he would not himself seek re-election). In 2004, this was repeated, and elections promised. New 
elections will, however, according to the Government, require a new constitution, a complex voter registration 
exercise (most of the adult population have no identity cards, further complicated by population 
displacements, the breakdown of local administrations, and land mines). The practical excuses for postponing 
the elections are nevertheless losing weight as time passes and the needs for democratic credentials are 
increasing. 
3 Democratic accountability can be defined as a situation where 1) the political power-holders carry out their 
mandate and exercise their powers in a way that is transparent , in the sense that it enables other institutions – 
and the public – to see what is actually done, and assess whether it is in accordance with the mandate and the 
relevant norms and rules; 2) the power-holders are answerable in the sense of being obliged to provide 
reasons for their decisions in public, which also implies an element of responsiveness; and 3) there are 
institutional checks or control mechanisms in place to prevent abuse of power and ensure that corrective 
measures are taken in cases where the mandate is contravened or rules are violated. In short, there is 
accountability when there are institutions with the ability to say ‘no’ to the executive and make it stick. A 
working definition of ‘democratic accountability’ emphasising these elements can be found in The definition 
of accountability is found in Gloppen and Rakner: “'Checking the State; Exploring Accountability Institutions 
in New Democracies”, CMI WP (forthcoming 2005). 
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still the norm in most African political systems; and the many institutions and reforms implemented 
have in most cases been relatively impotent.4  
 
The background is also the long academic discussion on the role of presidentialism in Africa’s 
development. Presidential political systems can in themselves be relatively democratic 5, but much 
of Africa’s presidentialism is highly problematic, because presidentialism here implies the 
concentration of political power in the hands of one individual, clientelist pyramids and factional 
networks, personality cults and the lack of checks and balances.6  
 
By looking at democratisation in Angola in terms of the democratic accountability of the 
Parliament, we seek to shed light on the interaction between the various institutions of government, 
emphasising aspects of separation of powers and the functioning of institutional checks and 
balances. We will see whether the Parliament is able (powerful enough, willing and competent) to 
counteract the executive dominance, in terms of the legal mandate, organisation and 
institutionalisation of the parliament. Furthermore, we will try to identify instances/cases where the 
executive is or is not constrained by operative accountability-relations, by looking at two basic 
processes: the passing of legislation and the passing of a national budget; and one significant event: 
the special sessions of Parliament during the summer of 2004.  
1.3 The methodology 
The methodology used for this case study on the Angolan Parliament is threefold. First of all, the 
study is based on a review of existing literature and written sources (in particular official documents 
and press reviews). Secondly, it is based on a survey addressed to 22 Members of Parliament. This 
survey covered 10% of the MPs, and was a representative selection of MPs in terms of polit ical 
affiliation (parties; although the smaller parties were over-represented in this sample), parliamentary 
commission membership, gender, and national/regional representation.7 Thirdly, the study is based 
on qualitative (exploratory and in-depth) interviews with about ten MPs, and additional interviews 
with party officials, representatives of state institutions, civil society organisations and the media. 
 
Although the survey covers about 10% of the MPs, considerable difficulties in obtaining answers 
points to some characteristics of the Angolan political climate and culture; a lack of democratic 
political traditions, including no tradition of transparency, deliberation, criticism and discussion. 
This can be explained by years of colonial rule followed by a totalitarian regime and civil war in the 
post-independence era. Even today, there is a feeling that there is no point in expressing your 
opinion and a tendency of suspicion, reluctance and withdrawal. There is even some fear of 
                                                 
4 According to Chabal and Deloz, “In most African countries, the state is no more than a décor, a pseudo-
Western façade masking the realities of deeply personalized political relations. There may well appear to be a 
relative institutionalization of the main state structures but such bodies are largely devoid of authority” 
(Chabal, P. & Daloz, J-P: Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument. London, 1999, James 
Currey/Indiana University Press; page 16).  
5 In political science, the distinction is usually made between presidential and parliamentary democracies 
(sometimes with hybrids like semi -presidential, semi-parliamentarian, presidential-premier and other systems 
in-between), between presidential systems which are systems of dual legitimacy (president elected by the 
people and controlling the executive branch including government), and parliamentarian systems in which the 
president (and government) is dependent on the legislature. In other words, pure parliamentarianism is a 
system of parliamentary domination, a system of lesser distinction (balance of powers) between president and 
parliament. 
6 See Bratton & van de Walle: Democratic Experiments in Africa. Cambridge 1997, Cambridge University 
Press. 
7 The survey questionnaire is attached in appendix B. 
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retaliation and suppression. The ‘politically possible’ and official standpoint was therefore sought 
and reiterated, a tendency also reflected in the survey results. 
2 Regulation of Parliamentary Authority 
Formally, the Assembleia Nacional (National Assembly) is a 220 member unicameral national 
assembly, with 130 members by proportional representation and 90 members from provincial 
districts.8 The deputies are furthermore representing 12 political parties,9 and 36 of the deputies are 
women.  
2.1 Presidentialism in Angola 
By looking at the mandate of the Angolan Parliament, its formally assigned powers, tasks and 
responsibilities according to the constitution and formal regulations,10 Angola displays the features 
of a strong presidential system at several levels. 
 
First of all, presidentialism is displayed in how the government is composed. The President of the 
Republic and the National Assembly are elected in separate elections, for fixed terms of office. The 
President of the Republic is elected in direct elections for a five year term, and the Government with 
its ministers and vice ministers are all nominated (appointed and can be dismissed) by the President. 
Furthermore, the President is effectively the Head of Government (presiding over the Council of 
Ministers). The President cannot be voted out of office by parliamentary vote of no confidence or 
censure, and there is no premier (Prime Minister) or cabinet (with executive functions) which is 
subject to the confidence of the legislature. This constitutional fact is the basis for placing Angola 
formally in the group of purely presidential systems on the scale from parliamentary to presidential 
countries. 
 
This is contrary to the official Angolan claim that the country is semi-presidential, due to the fact 
that there is a prime minister. We will still hold that Angola is purely presidential, because 
throughout most of the years 1999-2004 there was no prime minister, and although there is a Prime 
Minister today, he is not the Head of Government and he is subject to the President’s exclusive 
powers to nominate and dismiss.11 
 
The President chooses the Government (the cabinet or Council of Ministers), as well as the Prime 
Minister independently of the Parliament. The President, without any parliamentary consultation, 
                                                 
8 Officially there are 223 deputies elected on the basis of a direct and universal scrutiny. 90 deputies are 
elected (proportionally from party lists) from 18 multi-member provincial constituencies (4 or 5 seats for each 
province), 130 deputies are elected (from party lists) from the national constituency (the entire country), and 
tree deputies are elected from multi-member constituencies representing the Angolan community living 
abroad (two in Africa and one for the rest of the world). The three latter were not elected in the 1992 
elections. 
9 See Appendix A for a list of parties in the Angolan Parliament. 
10 The official English version of the current Constitution of Angola can be found at the website of the 
Embassy of the Republic of Angola, Washington U.S.A. 
[http://209.183.193.172/referenc/constitution/constit.htm (01.06.05)] 
11 The current Prime Minister Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos ("Nandó") is entrusted of ‘directing, 
guiding and coordinating the general action of the Government’, and ‘politically responsible’ before the 
President of the Republic under the terms of the Constitutional Law, but at the same time and in all practice is 
the President of the Republic the Head of Government and leading government meetings. There was even a 
dispute between the two when the Prime Minister called for a government meeting without the President’s 
knowledge, and dos Santos had to reaffirm his authority. 
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approval or possibility of censure, nominates all the government ministers and vice ministers. 
Although the President should ‘hear the political parties represented in the National Assembly’ 
before appointing the Prime Minister,12 this is a non-binding formality and there is no consultation 
necessary before dismissing the premier. 
 
There is, furthermore, no overlap in membership between the executive and the legislature. Unlike 
the Westminster model, members of the Angolan Parliament cannot at the same time be Ministers 
of Government (or hold certain other nominated high state positions).13 To the extent the President 
appoints MPs to government positions, they will be given a temporary leave from the Parliament 
and their seat is filled by the next on the party list.14 In 1997, the President even appointed a 
“Government of National Reconciliation” (GURN), which encompassed four ministers from 
UNITA and the other smaller parties, and a larger number of non-MPLA vice-ministers.15  
 
In other words, the Parliament (or parliamentary elections) has no influence whatsoever on the 
composition of Government.16 The President has absolute discretionary powers to nominate (and 
dismiss) his government. Besides, in appointing members of Government (ministers and vice 
ministers) the President is not only free to choose people from outside of the Parliament, but also 
from outside of the ruling party.  
 
Furthermore, the parliamentary mandate is weak because the executive (President of the Republic) 
has the exclusive right to dissolve the Parliament and call for new elections 17. The Parliament can in 
other words be dissolved by the President, but not vice versa. The Angolan political system is 
presidential because this right is not mutual. The Parliament cannot remove the President18, it can 
never call for elections, and the President’s right to call for new parliamentary elections is not 
balanced by any automatic call for simultaneous presidential elections. Therefore, the President’s 
dissolution powers are neither relative nor restricted.  
                                                 
12 Article 66 of the Constitution. 
13 Article 82 of the Angolan Constitution states that ‘the term of office a Member shall be incompatible with a 
ministerial post; paid employment by foreign companies or international organisations; being president and 
member of the administrative board of a limited company, a shareholding manager of a company, director 
general or deputy director general of a public enterprise; ant that the following may not be MPs: judges and 
members of military or militarized forces on active service’. 
14 This is replacement, in other words, as the seat will be filled by a representative of the same party (the next 
on the party list). 
15 This has rendered the status of UNITA as ‘an opposition party’ very much in doubt. UNITA, the second 
biggest party in Parliament with 67 deputies, is dwarfing all the smaller parties (see appendix A), but claims 
to be ‘in opposition’ in Parliament at the same time as it is represented in the Government! 
16 That is, according to the constitution, the nomination of Prime Minister and Parliament ministers shall be 
“after hearing the political parties represented in the National Assembly”. This is an informal practice only, as 
the formation of a government does not require any parliamentary vote of confidence or other formal 
parliamentary sanction.  
17 Constitution of Angola, Article 66: the President can “decree the dissolution of the National Assembly after 
consultation with the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly and the Council of the 
Republic”. According to Article 95, there is only few restrictions on this right; “The National Assembly may 
not be dissolved within the six months subsequent to its election, in the last quarter of the term of office of the 
President of the Republic, during the term of office of the interim President of the Republic or during a state 
of siege or state of emergency.” 
18 However, according to the Constitution, Article 65, ‘The President of the Republic shall not be responsible 
for acts carried out during the discharge of his duties, except in the case of bribery or treason. Proceedings 
shall be initiated by the National Assembly, on the proposal of one-fifth and a decision approved by a two-
thirds majority of Members present, and the trial shall be conducted by the Supreme Court’. This means that 
any impeachment proposal need to be on bribery or treason, to be initiated with the support of at least one 
fifth of the deputies, and that any impeachment ruling must be approved by at least two thirds of the deputies. 
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Secondly, there are few other constitutional means by which the Parliament can hold executive 
power to account. The initiative for constitutional reforms and new legislation emanates largely 
from the presidency, for instance, and the Parliament’s budgetary powers are weak. Furthermore, 
the capacity of the Angolan Parliament is weak in terms of resources, administrative and technical 
expertise and assistance, and in terms of internal organisation (see below),  
 
Thirdly, the ruling party MPLA is in full control of the parliamentary process through its absolute 
majority (129 of 220 deputies). Coupled with MPLA’s history of one-party rule and the established 
informal tactics of presidential domination, it seems that Angola has instituted a political practice 
(tradition) in which the Parliament exercises to a very little degree its possibilities of checks and 
balances in the political system.  
 
There are only two factors pointing in the opposite direction. One is the fact that the political parties 
are relatively strong in Angola, and the second is that there is a recent upsurge in parliamentary 
initiatives and general activity. There is a constitutional and parliamentary reform process going on, 
transparency is increasing, and general elections are on the planning stage. All this may lead to a 
stronger Angolan parliament. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the constitution of Angola dates back to the single party 
communist era, only with (the two rounds of) constitutional amendments made in March and 
September 1991 aiming at changing Angola into a multiparty democracy with fundamental political 
rights and freedoms and the basic principles of a market economy. In other words, there are 
remnants of single party rule within the constitution, and the Parliament thus set down in 1998 a 
Constitutional Commission19 to work out an entirely new basic law (constitution) aiming at 
clarification of the political system, at separation of powers and the interdependence of the 
sovereign bodies of the state, and in guaranteeing the principles of a democratic state based on the 
rule of law in Angola.20  
 
It should also be noted that the aim of this new constitution is, – according to the ruling party –, to 
“reflect the country's reality and assure greater stability for the citizens”.21 This may signify the 
ruling party’s continued inclination of a strong presidency, which we also believe is the aim of the 
biggest opposition party, UNITA. 
 
Lastly, there is, according to Hodges (2004:56), “a high degree of presidential intervention in the 
day-to-day management of state affairs. Presidential advisers often have greater influence than 
ministers, leading to a situation where ministers are unable to assert their authority”. In the survey 
conducted for this analysis, the Deputies are also acknowledging the fact that the Parliament of 
Angola does not have the desired responsibility and influence of a democratic political system. 
                                                 
19 http://www.comissao-constitucional.gv.ao/. This was a provisional commission dissolved in November 
2004. 
20 The new constitution will probably have to be passed before new general elections can be held (at least this 
is a condition set by the MPLA and endorsed by UNITA, although the current constitution does not inhibit an 
electoral process – elections are covered by the existing Election Law. However, an is sue of constitutional 
concern is the fact that the current Parliament will have to pass this new constitution, but it is questionable 
whether the current Parliament’s mandate is still valid. The current Parliament was elected in 1992, for a four 
year period with a self-proclaimed mandate extension due to the resurgence of civil war, but many people are 
questioning its legality. 
21 According to Angolan National Assembly's Constitutional Commission chairman and head of the ruling 
party parliamentary bench, Bornito de Sousa, in a speech in October 2004 (Angola Press Agency, October 7, 
2004). 
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2.2 Laws regulating the Parliament 
In addition to the constitution, the Angolan Parliament has also adopted a number of laws and 
regulations controlling the workings of the Parliament. There is a law on the Organisation of the 
National Assembly; laws on the Status and Remuneration of Deputies; an Internal Regulation of the 
National Assembly, as well as an Electoral Code and a law on Political Parties, which are all 
regulating and influencing the operations of the Parliament.22  
 
In its plenary session of 2003, the Parliament again reviewed and approved the National Assembly's 
internal regulation. The first presentation of the new regulation draft occurred in December 2001 
and was for several times postponed on the opposition's petition. The new draft was intended to 
overcome shortcomings, loopholes, omissions and unconstitutional situations noted in the previous 
regulation approved in 1992. These intended changes to the legislature, proposed by the ruling party 
bench, were meant for the updating and modernisation of the Parliament's functioning, as well as 
strengthening its democratic character, plus a better and major intervention of the people's 
representatives. Its reformulation took into account the Parliament's ten-year experience as a 
multiparty parliament, coupled with the Parliamentary Law compared with those of countries 
comprising the Portuguese Speaking Countries Community (CPLP).  
2.3 Parliamentary powers: the law making process 
According to the constitution, the National Assembly has absolute supremacy when it comes to the 
passing of legislation in areas of national strategic interest. The right to initiate legislation, however, 
does not rest only with the deputies (Members of Parliament) and the Parliament’s Committees (and 
Party Groups), but also with the Government.23 According to the interviews, (there are no statistics 
available on this, but the Deputies were unanimous), some 90% of all legislation is initiated by the 
Government.  
 
Although proposals are sometimes initiated, discussed and formulated (with legal technical 
assistance) within the ruling party structure, laws are basically initiated and formulated within the 
Government (Council of Ministers and some government ministry or office, sometimes with 
external expertise and stakeholders involved). The proposal is then formally passed on via the 
Council of Ministers and the President’s Office to the Parliament for approval. In practical terms, 
most legislation is initiated and formulated by the President’s office, and it passes through 
Parliament without much discussion. It is the ruling party MPLA structures that might have proper 
political discussions on legal propositions, rather than the Parliament.  
 
One example is the proposal for a new Press Bill, which was initiated by the Ministry of 
Information and Social Communication. The Ministry as well as the journalists themselves 
recognised the need for a revision of the press law, but the first proposal was dismissed by the 
Parliament. The President of the Republic then appointed a commission to redraft the law 
(constituted by the leader of the Bar Association, the Journalists’ Syndicate, the Union of Angolan 
                                                 
22 Lei Orgânica da Assembleia Nacional; Lei Orgânica do Estatuto do Deputado; Lei Orgânica do Estatuto 
Remuneratório do Deputado; Regimento Interno da Assembleia Nacional; Le i Eleitoral; Lei dos Partidos 
Políticos. 
23 According to Article 93 of the constitution: “Members, parliamentary groups and the Government shall 
have the right to propose legislation“. There is one very significant limitation to this right, however, namely 
that “Members and parliamentary groups shall not in the course of the economic year present draft laws that 
involve an increase in the expenditure or decrease in the State revenue established in the Budget”. This 
obligation is currently inhibiting the approval of the new Press Law, for instance. 
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Journalists, and two Parliament representatives). The new draft was completed and passed on to the 
Parliament in January 2005, but is not yet approved.24 
 
According to the constitution, laws can also be initiated by the Parliament itself, by individual 
deputies through their party groups or committees, or by the party groups or committees. Over the 
functioning period of the current parliament, this has happened very rarely, however. The most 
important initiative from Parliament was the law establishing an anti-corruption commission in 
Angola (Alta Autoridade contra a Corrupção), which was passed in April 1996, and the Law on 
HIV/AIDS, passed in 2003. 
 
According to the survey conducted for this study, the parliamentarians are of the opinion that they 
lack the proper influence on the drafting, wording and passing of bills. Only in some cases did the 
Parliamentarians report that they had a decisive influence on the phrasing of the new laws, namely 
on the War Veteran’s Bill, on the Law of the Budget Process, and on the recently passed Petroleum 
and Land laws. 
 
Any law passed by the Parliament will have to be ratified by the President. But, he has a veto. 
Although the constitution does not clearly empowers him with a veto, article 71 of the 
Constitutional Law rules that if ‘the laws referred to in Article  66 (s) [are] not promulgated by the 
President of the Republic, and Government decrees [are] not signed by the President of the 
Republic, [they] shall be null and void’.25 In practice this corresponds to veto powers. 
 
Besides, in cases where a law of the President’s disliking has been passed, he can choose to delay 
the ratification, and he can use other ‘administrative’ means, like the issuing of secondary 
legislation (decrees), or by postponing and delaying the process of implementing the new 
legislation.  
 
The President has in some instances preferred this latter method. One example of an important 
initiative from Parliament was the anti-corruption commission in Angola. The President ratified this 
law, but there has been no following up, no actual establishment of the institution, and no concrete 
action taken to implement this law. 
 
The Parliament’s capacity to check and control the implementation of legislation is very weak. 
According to the survey conducted for this study, there are no doubts about the situation: only one 
MP believes the Parliament verifies and controls the Government’s implementation of the approved 
laws. Six MPs believe the Parliament ‘rarely’ or in ‘some ways’ are exercising this control; three 
states that the laws are not at all regularised and one considers that the Parliament exercises no 
control at all, despite its formal mechanisms to do so. 
2.4 Parliamentary powers: the budget process 
The Parliament’s role in discussing, altering, formally approving and not least in overseeing and 
controlling the state budgets of Angola has been a recurrent problem. Although the Parliament will 
– according to the Constitution – discuss and approve the National Plan and the General Budget 
(and its execution reports), as well as contracting and granting loans, this role is limited in practical 
terms. Due to high levels of oil income and a civil war fuelled by “oil for weapons” arrangements, 
emergency and secrecy provisions, vested elite interests and high levels of corruption, 
                                                 
24 From the news agency allAfrica.com; http://allafrica.com/stories/200410290547.html  
25 Article 66 s) points to the President’s power ‘To sign and promulgate laws approved by the National 
Assembly and executive laws approved by the Government’.  
CMI WORKING PAPER ACCOUNTABILITY ON THE MOVE WP 2005: 11 
 9 
parliamentary insight into state income and expenditure has been severely restricted, and much 
remains to be done in order to have full parliamentary oversight and an effective budget control. 26 
 
Because of large budgetary and balance-of-payments deficits, increasing indebtedness and 
increasing external pressure (led by the World Bank and IMF, supported by the private banks of the 
‘Paris Club’), this situation is about to change, however. 
 
Some observers would now claim that all state income is accounted for and made transparent 
through the National Bank and the budget process. Other observers would hold that large tracts of 
the Government’s income, in particular from the oil and diamonds sector, are still un-accounted for. 
The IMF, for instance, had as late as 2002 “concerns about the handling and disposition of oil and 
diamond concessions, revenue flows in the oil sector, the finances of Sonangol, and external 
borrowing practices” (Hodges 2004:121). However, government commitments to halt extra-
budgetary expenditures, to improve the transparency of government finances through an improved 
budget process, have led to official claims that all incomes and expenditures are now accounted for. 
 
In formal terms, the budget process has improved considerably in quality over the last years, but the 
passing of the state budget is still a learning process. Formally, each of the ministries will present 
their budget requests to the Ministry of Finance by the end of June, and the Ministry of Finance 
prepares the draft budget proposal to the Council of Min isters, which discusses and approves the 
budget proposition on behalf of the Government.27 On October 15, the Minister of Finance then 
presents the Government’s budget proposal to the Parliament. 
 
The revision and approval process by the Parliament will then take about two months (the revised 
budget will have to be approved by December 31). The different provincial deputies will be 
consulted, and the party groups will discuss it. So far, it seems that only the ruling party MPLA has 
a proper budget discussion in their party group. Then also each of the parliamentary committees 
will discuss it, highlight their issues of concern, and present a report to the fifth committee, the 
Economy and Finance committee. The real discussions seem to take place in this 30-member 
committee. The fifth committee then submits a final report to the Parliament President, and the 
revised budgets are discussed and voted over in a plenary session. 
 
The Angolan Parliament lacks a lot in terms of technical and economic competence to make a real 
influence in the budget revision process. Even the finance committee has a lack of experience, 
capacity, and expertise. Support staff with relevant economic and budgetary expertise is very 
limited, and the other committees have none, and a very weak political culture of budget making. 
 
This fact is acknowledged also by the Deputies themselves in the survey conducted for this study. 
The majority of the parliamentarians are of the opinion that the Parliament does not have enough 
                                                 
26 According to a statement of IMF Deputy Managing Director, Mr. Takatoshi Kato, upon his visit to Angola 
in October 2004; “the Government needs to build upon recent advances to meet the President's objective that 
scarce resources are used in the best possible manner for the people of Angola who have borne immense 
sacrifices during the last two decades. This will involve further efforts to enhance transparency in the 
Government’s budget and central bank operations, including the management of oil resources” 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2004/pr04233.htm [02.11.04]). See also the 2004 Hu man Rights 
Watch report “Some Transparency, No Accountability” 
(http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/angola0104/angola0104.pdf  [100605]). 
27 It should be noted that the various ministries has a very weak capacity and culture for making detailed and 
comprehensive budget requests. Not even the Ministry of Finance is adequately equipped to make 
professional budget preparations. Expertise, research and capacity is lacking. It is the Council of Ministers 
and the President’s office, and to some extent the MPLA, that holds the decisive capacity, technically as well 
as politically. 
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influence in the national budget. This is substantiated by statements on their lack of influence on 
macroeconomic policies and economic stability as well as economic policies concerning poverty 
alleviation and reduced social inequalities. The survey results suggest a need for deputies to have 
more technical and special expertise, in the commissions. 
 
So far, the Angolan Parliament has made no substantial changes to the Government’s budget 
proposition. Some small increases in social sectors has been registered, and a corresponding 
reduction in military and government administration expenses. The deputies seem to be more 
concerned about certain details, than about the overall distribution of the funds.  
 
In terms of registered political or ideological differences between the partie s on economic priorities, 
there seems to have been almost none so far. The political parties are not expressing their different 
priorities in the budget debates, neither in the committees nor in the plenary discussions on the 
budget. And there are no alternative budget propositions made. The only visible differencing point 
was made when UNITA for symbolic reasons voted en bloc against the budget in late 2003. In late 
2004, the Economy and Finance commission examined the budget proposal and passed it on to the 
Plenary for approval, and the Parliament approved it with only one UNITA vote against it. 
2.5 Parliamentary powers: other means of accountability and 
control 
The President of the Republic and the Parliament are two institutions both elected in direct 
elections, but with different terms. The President is elected for five years, the Parliament for four 
years.28 The elections and terms will therefore rarely coincide in the future. 
 
This means that a French-style ‘cohabitation’ is a theoretic possibility in Angola. That is, the 
President and the majority of the Parliament can be of two different party colours. In terms of 
democracy, this is no problem, but in terms of policy and command capacity this can be 
problematic. With a strong separation of powers and strong mutual sanctions (blocking capacities), 
a president and a parliament with different party affiliations can possibly block each other from 
making efficient policy decisions.29 In Angola, this will depend, however, on the future constitution 
as well as future political situations. At the moment, the Parliament is in no position to create a 
political deadlock situation because of the strong presidency and the dominant ruling party. 
 
Additional parliamentary control and ‘checks and balances’ mechanisms can in theoretical terms be 
exercised, among other things, through hearings, audits and inspections, special agencies and 
appointments. The use of these will depend much on the political ‘climate’ and on the self-esteem 
and institutional pride of the parliament.30 
 
In Angola, hearings are instituted in the political system. 31 The various parliamentary committees 
regularly make inquiries to relevant ministries, and individual ministers are called in by Parliament 
                                                 
28 Angolan Constitution, article 59 and 79. 
29 According to Kurian (2003:783), “the legislatures that are least able to constrain the executive are those 
associated with the very strongest and with the very weakest political party systems”. 
30 We know for instance that in Vietnam – a country with a one-party communist system in which the 
Parliament is formally subjected to the party – the Parliament is still able to exercise some influence. The 
Vietnamese Parliament is in currently demonstrating and increasing its influence vis -à-vis the Vietnamese 
Communist Party and the Government, despite its very weak mandate and formal powers, among other things 
via hearings, commissions and ‘leakages’ to the media. 
31 Article 83 of the constitution reads: Members of the National Assembly shall have the right, in accordance 
with the Constitutional Law and the Regulations of the National Assembly, to question the Government or 
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to answer specific questions. Legally, the Prime Minister as well as other members of Government 
should attend parliamentary hearings on censure motions, ministerial reports, questions and 
National Plan/General Budget. Notwithstanding the legal obligations, some members of the 
Government have sometimes refused to give detailed information about actions they have taken.32  
 
Of the special committees and bodies nominated by the Angolan Parliament, with a mandate that 
includes some form of monitoring of the actions of the Government and of the other state organs, 
the National Audit is the most important. The Audit Department of the Ministry of Finance is not 
functioning well, however. It does not have the proficiency and not even the clearly defined powers, 
as yet (according to interviews). Sometimes, however, the President of the Audit Department as 
well as individual deputies and representatives of the Economy and Finance committees make visits 
to provinces to check the actual use of budget allocations and public investments.  
 
The Parliament has also established an anti-corruption commission, but the necessary Government 
implementing action has not been taken. More important are the complaints and suggestions coming 
in from the public to the “Human rights and citizen petitions, complaints and suggestions” 
committee. This 22 member committee is quite active, addressing various government ministries 
and agencies on behalf of the citizens and their complaints. In this respect, the committee acts quite 
like an ombudsman’s office. 
 
On the other hand, according to the survey conducted for this study, the MPs are indicating that the 
Parliament has the power to, and have used the power to establish special investigative, ‘fact-
finding’ commissions. In particular, the MPs mentioned the special commissions established to 
investigate and analyse the ‘bloody Friday’ case, the case of the destiny of the former Kinaxixi 
market, the demolition of the D. Ana Joaquina Palace, and other specific government activities.  
 
An important aspect of a parliament’s control of executive decisions is the possibility of influencing 
nominations. In Angola this influence is quite weak. In addition to the President’s exclusive, 
constitutional right to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, he also appoints other senior state 
personnel (like the Governor of the National Bank of Angola, Supreme Court judges, the Attorney 
General, Chief of General Staff, Chiefs and Deputies of Staff of the different branches of the armed 
forces; and Provincial Governors), “on the proposal of the Prime Minister”. The Parliament has no 
formal role in appointments, although informal consultations are taking place. 
 
This point is also clearly reflected in the survey conducted for this study. The majority of the 
deputies consider that the Parliament ‘does not’ have any influence on nominations to senior 
government positions. One deputy added that both appointments and dismissals are the exclusive 
right of the President, and that ‘the deputies don’t even know how these decisions are made’. Only 
one deputy thinks that in some cases, the President ‘consults’ and ‘takes into account’ the opinion of 
the Parliament.  
2.6 Informal powers 
During summer 2004, events took place of great (negative) significance as to the autonomy of the 
Angolan Parliament and to the respect of formal rules. When officially not in session because of 
                                                                                                                                                     
any of the members thereof, and to obtain from all public bodies and enterprises the cooperation needed to 
discharge their duties. 
32 One recent and well-known case was the purchase of two armoured luxury cars, each worth US$ 800 000, 
for the President of the Supreme Court. Neither the Minister of Transports nor the Minister of Finance 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer) appeared for the Parliament, arguing that they needed to be summoned by the 
President of the National Assembly and not some opposition deputies only. 
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holidays (the Angolan Parliament is in session from October 15 to 15 July, with a standing 
committee in charge of business during the holidays from July till October), two important laws 
were passed; on oil and land.  
 
According to practices and regulations, no major debates should take place and no important piece 
of legislation should be passed when the Parliament is not in session, although special sessions can 
be called for.33 What happened over the holiday period of 2004 was that the Parliament discussed 
and approved the new Land Law and the new Petroleum Law, not in plenary but in the Permanent 
Commission ‘because of its importance to the country’.34  
 
These are two laws of great importance. The Angolan National Assembly had begun to discuss the 
pressing issue of land and this was applauded by land right advocates and NGOs. Organisations 
such as Development Workshop (DW) and Rede Terra (Land Network) had been invited to 
consultations, and gave their opinion in thoroughly studied reports.35 The NGOs have complained, 
however, that their opinions were not reflected in the final law. On July 27, 2004, the draft law was 
sent to the Permanent Commission, and on August 10, it was approved. 
 
The Petroleum Law was also pushed through at the same time, without much prior consultation, 
partly as a result of pressure from the international oil companies. The Petroleum Law will be of 
quite some importance for future investors and investments. 
 
These events demonstrate a lack of respect for formal procedure and a lack of respect for 
democratic principles, because the Standing Committee was called in to pass two important laws 
when the Parliament was not is session. Furthermore, the opposition parties in Parliament were in 
general boycott of parliamentary work, because of divisions within the Constitutional Commission 
over the process of establishing dates for a new election (UNITA is pushing for elections to be held 
in late 2005 whereas the President had hinted at 2006 to allow time for a Constitutional review). 
 
Also according to the survey carried out for this analysis, there were strong opinions about the 
power concentration in the Presidency. In answering the question ‘in your opinion, are there 
examples that the President’s Cabinet or the Government do not respect the decisions made by the 
Parliament?’ seven deputies stated yes and three said ‘sometimes’.  To illustrate this, the MPs of the 
                                                 
33 According to Constitution Article 96;”The legislature shall comprise four legislative sessions. Each 
legislative session shall last one year and shall start on 15 October. The normal period in which the National 
Assembly shall function shall be eight months and shall start on 15 October, without prejudice to intervals 
provided for in the Regulations of the National Assembly and suspensions determined by a two-thirds 
majority of Members present. The National Assembly may meet in special session whenever necessary on the 
decision of a plenary meeting or on the initiative of the Standing Commission or of more than half of its 
Members. The National Assembly may meet in special session outside its normal session on the decision of a 
plenary meeting, on the initiative of the Standing Commission or more than half of its Members or when 
convened by the President of the Republic”. 
34 The Permanent Commission is bestowed with the authority to run current affairs when the Parliament is not 
in session (see 3.3 below). 
35 And they expressed deep concern about the content and the potential effects of the Land Bill. The bill fails 
to recognize the everyday realities of land tenureship in Angola, and it does not take existing institutional 
shortcomings into consideration. For example, large proportions of the rural population is internally displaced 
and dispossessed, and most of the poor have no documentation to prove legal ownership of their land. In fact, 
the proposed law risks mis labelling informal landholders as illegal occupants. Although landholders can 
request to have their legal entitlements to their land recognized according to this law, they have but one year 
to do so. Given Angola’s weak institutional capacity, it is very unlikely that the vast majority will be able to 
present and document their claims, and very unlikely that most applications will even be considered. It seems 
that the new rules are designed basically to make it possible for the relatively well off and well connected to 
secure urban housing property rights and to seize rural land. 
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sample gave in particular the examples of public infrastructure investments that are not included in 
the budget (General State Budget), and of laws not being implemented, not even regulated. Only 
one MP stated that ‘there have been no accusations of such practice’. 
3 Organisational set-up 
Each legislature includes four sessions (it is elected for a four year term), starting on 15th October 
and normally ending in July. As a unicameral assembly, debates, decision-making and formal 
voting takes place in plenary sessions. The plenary sessions normally takes place from Tuesday to 
Thursday throughout the parliamentary year. 
3.1 Financing the Parliament 
In formal terms, the budget of the Parliament is approved by the Parliament itself, being the budget 
approving authority. However, the actual size of the operating budget is a result of the budget 
process as such, and a result of the actual allocations made by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
In the budget process (see below), the Parliament as well as the various ministries will come up 
with their wish-lists before the Government prepares the state budget proposal. Because of the 
limited influence of the Parliament on the budget process (the Government and the ruling party 
exercises more influence on the budgets then does the Parliament), the financial autonomy of the 
Parliament remains weak. 
 
This weakness is also clearly expressed by the MPs surveyed for this study. The majority of the 
parliamentarians believe the financial resources attributed to the Parliament are very limited, and 
that it even prevents the Parliament and Deputies from accomplishing their mission.  
 
The formal pay for deputies is relatively good. The basic salary is quite moderate (about $ 5,000 a 
month), but when adding all fringe benefits and privileges, this amounts to a substantial and very 
attractive remuneration. The fringe benefits and privileges include for instance a very valuable 
health insurance cover with treatment at specialised clinics abroad when necessary.36 Besides, 
deputies have parliamentary immunity (from certain forms of legal prosecution). However, in the 
survey conducted for this study, the majority of the MPs stated that the remuneration of MPs is too 
limited to enable them to do their job properly. 
3.2 Organising the Parliament: presidency and committees  
The Angolan Parliament has a Presidency that includes the President of the National Assembly (the 
Speaker, currently Roberto António Victor Francisco de Almeida), who is elected by simple 
majority of votes, as proposed by the majority party (or majority coalition).37 Like in most countries 
(without a vice president), the President of the National Assembly is in formal terms the second in 
                                                 
36 According to Hodges (Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, 2004:64), one of the tactics used by the 
Government to make a split in UNITA and force people into the new, regime loyal “UNITA-Renovada”, was 
to strip the non-compliant parliamentarians of their parliamentary privileges like “homes, cars and cellular 
phones”. Furthermore, according to Hodges, ’worthy’ members of the political establishment, including 
parliamentarians, is receiving an annual ‘Christmas bonus’ (also members of UNITA and other ‘opposition’ 
parties, have they behaved well). This bonus has “in some years run as high as $30,000, dwarfing their annual 
salaries” (Hodges 2004:61). 
37 In other words, with the right to nominate a National Assembly President resting with the largest party, the 
ruling party MPLA will have the exclusive right to this position for as long as it keeps its majority. 
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the state hierarchy, after the President of the Republic.38 He has administrative as well as political 
functions, and he represents the Parliament in international organisations and in official visits. The 
Presiding Office also includes four Deputy-Speakers and four Table Clerks, proposed by political 
parties in proportion of their seats. 
 
When the Parliament is not in session (holidays, when it is dissolved etc.) there is a Permanent 
Commission bestowed with the authority to run current affairs, composed of by the President of the 
Assembly, two Vice Presidents (representing the two largest party groups, MPLA and UNITA) and 
12 deputies chosen proportionally from the party groups. In addition to this, the Angolan Parliament 
has nine standing (Permanent Work) committees. These are to assist and prepare the activity of the 
Plenary, studying projects laws and resolutions, etc. These committees also have representation 
proportional to the representation of the parties, 39 and the nine committees are: 
 
1. Constitutional and legal affairs (Assuntos Constitucionais e Jurídicos Regimentos e Mandatos) 
2. Defence, security and internal order (Defensa, Segurança e Ordem Interna) 
3. Foreign relations, international co-operation and Angolan communities abroad (Relações 
Exteriores, Cooperação Internacional e Comunidades Angolanas no Estrangeiro) 
4. Local administration and local authorities (Administração e Poder Local) 
5. Economy and finance (Economia e Finanças) 
6. Education, science, culture, religious affairs, sports and media (Educação, Ciência, Cultura, 
Assuntos Religiosos, Desporto e Comunicação Social) 
7. Health, environment, social affairs and war veterans (Saúde, Meio Ambiente, Acção Social 
Emprego e Antigos Combatentes) 
8. Parliamentary mandate, ethics and protocol (Mandatos, Ética e Decoro Parlamentar)  
9. Human rights and citizen petitions, complaints and suggestions (Direitos Humanos, Petições, 
Reclamações e Sugestões dos Cidadãos). 
 
The nine standing committees are not reflecting the organisation of the 29 government ministries. 
Although they are supposed to cover all activities of the ministries and the Office of the President, 
this is in practice impossible.  
 
Still, the MPs themselves are expressing satisfaction on the way the Parliament is organised 
internally. Also according to the survey conducted for this study, the MPs are ranking the 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs Commission as the most important one, seconded by the Economy 
and Finance Commission, probably reflecting the process of constitutional revision in the country.  
 
In addition to the formal organisation above, lobbying is also directly influencing deputies and the 
Parliament as such. There is no regulation or recording of lobbying activities going on, and there is 
reason to believe that lobbyism is a recent, limited and disorganized phenomenon. According to the 
survey conducted for this study, the parliamentarians say that lobbyism takes place. 40 Due to the 
lack of regulation, lobbyism in Angola will, however, raise future questions on transparency and 
accountability.   
                                                 
38 The President of the National Assembly will fully replace the President of the Republic in case of 
‘temporary impediment or vacancy’. 
39 Ad hoc committees (Eventual and Special Committees) are created for carrying out specific tasks, and 
closed as soon as these are completed. 
40 One of the few instances reported is the lobbying of various NGOs during parliamentary discussions on the 
new Land Law. Rede Terra (Land Network), a coalition of NGOs working together on the land issue, did for 
instance distribute a statement to members of Parliament reminding them of the bill's major shortcomings. 
The parliamentarians furthermore mention the Angolan Industrial Association (AIA), War Veterans and 
certain gender and environmental NGOs. 
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3.3 Organising the Parliament: party groups and independents 
Of Angola’s 125 registered political parties, 12 are represented in Parliament, and all National 
Assembly deputies have a party affiliation. According to the electoral law, the political parties are 
presenting their candidates for election, and every candidate must represent a political party. Even 
candidates for presidential elections will have to be nominated by a political party (or present 5000 
signatures from at least 10 different provinces) in order to stand for elections. Of the 220 member 
National Assembly, 130 deputies are elected (from party lists) from Angola as a national 
constituency (the entire country), and 90 deputies are elected (proportionally from party lists) from 
18 multi-member provincial constituencies (4 or 5 seats for each province). 
 
This is an efficient barrier against independent candidates and independent members of parliament, 
of which there are none. However, it does not preclude the formation of micro-parties with only one 
candidate, the so-called ‘vote-for-me’ parties run by and for the party president.  
 
The political parties are in other words determining the composition of the partly lists for elections, 
and therefore to a large extent the parties are deciding who will be elected as members of 
Parliament. Besides, there is a ban on crossing the floor. In contrast to most other parliaments, it is 
not possible to change party once elected. A deputy is elected as a representative of his party, and if 
he leaves (or is expelled from) the party, his seat becomes vacant and it will be filled by the next 
candidate on the elected party list. There is consequently no need for by-elections to fill vacancies.  
 
Thus, the role of the political parties in selecting, nominating, promoting (and eventually expelling) 
candidates is crucial for any individual seeking election, as well as for his position as an MP during 
his term. Every deputy is dependent on his political party, and party discipline is therefore quite 
strong. 
 
This is also reflected in the survey conducted for this study. Two thirds believe the party discipline 
and obedience is strong, and they justified it with the fact that elections are between parties, and the 
party is deciding the names on the party list. Secondly, they said the organisational structure of the 
party leads to discipline, that there is “a natural following and a fear of retaliation”.41 
 
Furthermore, according to the deputies interviewed, about half consider that all parties represented 
in Parliament “are organised, coherent and have some influence”, while the other half indicated that 
only some of the political parties were organised and coherent, namely MPLA, to a lesser degree 
UNITA, and to a low degree PRS, PLD and FNLA.  
 
Debates and negotiations are therefore largely taking place within the parties, and the political 
priorities and standpoints of the parties are to a large degree determined by possible political gain of 
the party, not by the interests of the constituencies. The Members of Parliament are also relating to 
and reporting to their respective parties, much more than to their districts (constituencies) and 
voters. 
 
In terms of party organisation within the Parliament, each party forms a parliamentary group, except 
for parties with less than tree members; they will have to join larger party groups or to form party 
coalitions. Each parliamentary group has access to meeting facilities and some secretarial services. 
The parliamentary group of MPLA, for instance, meets every week, and is an important and lively 
discussion forum.  
 
                                                 
41 At the same time, as noted by one of the MPs interviewed and by irregular news reports, there are still 
factions within several of the party groups. 
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The party parliamentary groups are represented according to their size in the Parliament’s various 
Committees, and they have a role in debating issues, suggesting legislation etc. prior to committee 
meetings and plenary voting. Furthermore, the party group presidents are meeting regularly 
(Conferência dos Presidentes dos Grupos Parlamentares) to set the order of the day, and they are 
electing the National Assembly Presidency. 
3.4 MP background and representativity 
Of the 220 members of the Angolan Parliament, only 35 are women (16%). According to some of 
the deputies interviewed, the representativeness of the Angolan Parliament is relatively good, 
although it is somewhat weak in terms of women, as it is in terms of the rural society. This is also 
reflected in a national political survey from 2003, in which the respondents were asked if the 
number of women in Government, National Assembly and state administration was high, medium 
or low. The general opinion was that female representation was too low (IDI 2003:15).  
 
Even with 90 of the 220 deputies elected as direct representatives of their districts, the national seats 
and proportional character of the electoral system has prevented any strong regional affiliation of 
the political parties. There are a few parties with exclusive representation in some provinces (MPLA 
representing alone the districts of Kuanza-Norte, Kunene and Malange; UNITA taking all five seats 
from the district of Bié), and there are provinces where some of the parties are relatively strong. In 
addition to all seats in Bié, UNITA has the majority of deputies from Benguela, Huambo and 
Kuando-Kubango, which proves it has a stronghold in the central parts of the country (central west 
and central south). PRS has two representatives from Lunda-Sul and one from Lunda-Norte, which 
indicates a north-east stronghold of this party, and FNLA has two representatives from Zaire 
province in the far north (which is also its historical heartland).  
 
In terms of regional representation in the Parliament, this aspect also seems to have low priority. 
Deputies are to a very little degree voicing the interests of their local constituencies, including 
people elected on a district list. According to one study, almost 4 of every 5 responses indicate it is 
difficult for people as citizens to identify their political leaders, their deputies from the province or 
municipality, “because they never show up to listen to their concerns” (IRI report 2003:9).42 
 
The National Assembly deputies are well educated. About half of the MPLA deputies has a 
university education (60%, i.e. not necessarily a university degree, but university training), one third 
has secondary school (professional training) and about 15% has primary school only. Of the UNITA 
MPs, the distribution is about 50-50 in terms of higher/secondary education. Very few UNITA MPs 
have primary school only; the UNITA deputies are consequently not ‘the people from the bush’, 
which is the popular prejudice. Of the smaller and one-man parties, the education levels are even 
slightly higher.43 
3.5 Administrative support 
The parliamentary administration has several offices for day-to-day services; there is an office for 
judicial assistance (Gabinete de Assessoria Jurídica); an office for secretarial and technical support 
(Direcção de Apoio Parlamentar); for administration and finances (Direcção de Administração e 
                                                 
42 This report demonstrate a low esteem of political parties: 42% of the sample have the belief that there is no 
freedom of political thought within the political parties; although the perception is more favourable among 
party 
members (58% believe there is freedom of political thought within the parties) (IRI report 2004:10). 
43 These are rough estimates based on information given on 50% of the deputies, on the official web-site of 
the Angolan Parliament (http://www.parlamento.ao/deputados.htm) 
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Finanças), for documentation and information (Direcção de Documentação e Informação) with a 
small and efficient, but very limited library and archive; an office for external relations and protocol 
(Direcção de Relações Públicas e Relações Internacionais e Protocolo ); and an office for 
constituency relations (Gabinete de Apoio aos Núcleos). The latter assists deputies in keeping 
contact with their local constituencies.44 
 
Concerning the existence and adequacy of administrative support, in terms of administrative 
personnel, secretarial staff, availability of expertise on juridical, financial and other technical 
matters, library etc., the deputies surveyed for this study expressed their dissatisfaction. The large 
majority said the administrative support resources are limited and rarely at the MPs disposal, and 
sometimes their responsibilities hindered by this (only one was of the opinion that administrative 
support was sufficient). Several MPs pointed to the fact that the number of secretarial staff was 
sufficient, but that their competence and efficiency was inadequate.   
3.6 Technical facilities, offices, infrastructure, research, travel, 
etc 
The Angolan Parliament is situated in the centre of Luanda, in a former cinema building. Despite 
several extensions of the building to make it the ‘Congress Palace’, it is still too small to house all 
deputies and to provide them with decent working conditions. A new parliament building is in 
planning.  
 
The physical infrastructure is also weak. There are too few computers available to deputies; office 
and meeting facilities are limited, and technical infrastructures are inadequate. In the survey 
conducted for this study, the deputies claimed that these deficiencies made it difficult to fulfil their 
mandate. They exemplified this for instance by pointing to the lack of office space (often several 
deputies in one office) and lack of meeting facilities, a lack of paper, tables, computers and other 
basic equipment, and run down communication facilities (computers, internet, telephone, fax).  
 
The MPs also claimed that the Parliament has a weak research capacity. Although some 
consultancies and studies have been commissioned, the resources for this kind of support are very 
limited. 
 
4 Conclusions 
There is no academic consensus on whether a parliamentary system (for instance the Westminster 
model with a strong ruling party and a fusion of executive-legislative powers) or a presidential 
system (executive-legislative balance of powers) is more democratic.45 There is more academic 
consensus that for Africa, in its transitions from semi-authoritarian dominant party systems to more 
democratic systems, the horizontal checks and balances are absolutely essential. Given the strong 
tendency of voter alignment behind the ruling parties from the rural majority of the population, the 
respect for human rights including political rights will only be secured through a stronger internal 
balance of power, in which the national assemblies (and the courts) become essential. 
                                                 
44 The question has been raised whether deputies should have local regional offices established. 
45 There is some agreement, however, that the parliamentary system provides a higher degree of democratic 
accountability when there is a distinct two-party system. This condition is important, because the Westminster 
model will work at its best only in situations where voters have a clear choice between two alternatives, two 
parties or party blocks that constitutes credible government alternatives. 
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In Angola, the MPLA – UNITA constellation can be regarded as an emerging two-party system, 
given the dominance of these two parties historically, in the political field (in the civil war!), and 
now in Parliament.46 Angola has nevertheless a distinctly presidential system, without any 
tendencies or even aspirations for parliamentarism. The ruling party as well as the main opposition 
party is in favour of a strong presidency. 
 
There are nevertheless two basic elements of the presidential system that can give quite some 
parliamentary independence and thus the necessary checks and balances, when administered 
properly. These are first of all the facts that the Parliament is elected in separate elections. Secondly, 
there is the fact that there is no fusion in terms of people between the two institutions. Unlike the 
Westminster model, members of the parliament cannot at the same time be ministers of 
government. These two elements can give the parliament the necessary autonomy and legitimacy. 
 
Furthermore, there are some informal features of the political system of Angola that points in the 
direction of a stronger and more autonomous parliament. First of all, the political parties are 
relatively powerful. The system has made them decisive for who will stand for elections, the parties 
are the main organisational element of the parliamentary debate, members cannot cross the floor, 
etc.  
 
Secondly, there is a tendency of more pride, self-esteem and independence among the deputies, as 
the institution is gaining experience and is functioning better. Despite the weaknesses of its 
mandate, there could be processes of socialisation, of MPs finding their role  sufficiently valuable, 
honourable and personally beneficial, in order to push for more parliamentary authority and 
autonomy. Some initiatives, some debates, and some commissions are pointing in this direction. 
 
However, the Angolan parliament is basically very weak. It operates in a distinct presidential 
system with few powers to check on and restrict presidential powers. Its mandate is weak, for 
instance with no more than a ‘consultative’ role in forming the Government and in making 
nominations to higher positions within the state. It cannot remove the President or any government 
minister (except in exceptional cases). Furthermore, as seen from the analysis of the budget and 
law-making processes, its mandate and influence is weak. Regarding the budget process, the 
Angolan Parliament lacks a lot in terms of technical and economic competence to make a real 
influence. Even the finance committee has a lack of experience, capacity, and expertise. And so far, 
the Angolan Parliament has made no substantial changes to the Government’s budget proposition.  
 
This overall conclusion is also supported by the sample of Members of Parliament questioned for 
this study. On the question of the real political decisions were taken in Parliament or outside of it, 
the vast major ity of parliamentarians consider that the hard decisions are made by either the 
President/Government or by the ruling party (MPLA). Within the Parliament, the plenary or the 
parliamentary commissions holds little influence, again the Parliament’s party groups are 
considered the centres of decision making (again with the MPLA as the most influential). 
 
The capacity of the Angolan Parliament is also limited. According to the survey conducted for this 
study, the parliamentarians themselves were mentioning several factors that inhibited their work as 
deputies; weak preparation by the support staff, lack of discipline and assiduity among MPs (that 
                                                 
46 These two parties will probably be the dominant parties also after the next elections, given their historic 
strengths. That is, unless there is something to the rumours that the two parties are planning a merger (which 
is not unlikely: the UNITA cadres may well prefer negotiations with the ruling party in order to secure their 
positions, rather than open up for the uncertainties of an election). 
CMI WORKING PAPER ACCOUNTABILITY ON THE MOVE WP 2005: 11 
 19 
could be addressed through more binding formalities in proceedings), insufficient salaries and the 
lack of solutions to other practical problems among deputies, and weak physical infrastructures. 
 
The Parliament of Angola has nevertheless gained some impetus over the last few years. Internal as 
well as external pressures have made it impossible for the Angolan Government to rule without 
having the Parliament formally passing legislation on essential issues. Thus, the parliament is 
moving slowly and unevenly in a direction of better performance. There is a steep learning curve.  
 
According to the survey conducted for this study, the large majority of the parliamentarians (80% of 
the sample) still believe the MPs are showing pride and respect to the Parliament as an institution. 
They also believe people, in general, respect the Parliament and understand its problems. Some 
mentioned, however, the need to develop a greater attachment to the national symbols. And 
referring to the ability of the Parliament to maintain at least some principles of democracy and 
representation, despite the civil war and the lack of a renewed mandate, and one deputy said that “in 
spite of the representation in Parliament of the party that waged war, the House is functioning”.  
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Appendix A 
The political parties represented in current Angolan parliament (acronym, flag, name in Portuguese 
and English, party leader (leader of parliamentary group), % of votes in 1992 elections and number 
of seats): 
Party Full party name % of votes 
#  of 
seats  
MPLA 
 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Partido do Trabalho) 
(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) 
Mr. Bornito de Sousa Baltazar Diogo 
53.7  129 
UNITA 
 
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola  
(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) 
Mr. Constantino Zeferino 
34.1  67 
PRS 
 
Partido Renovador Social  
(Social Renewal Party, centrist) 
Mr. Lindo Bernardo Tito 
2.3 6 
FNLA 
 
Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola  
(National Front for the Liberation of Angola) 
Mr. Benjamim Manuel da Silva 
2.4 5 
PLD 
 
Partido Liberal Democrático  
(Liberal Democratic Party) 
Mrs. Analia Maria Caldeira de Victória Pereira Simeão 
2.4 3 
PRD 
 
Partido Renovador Democrático  
(Democratic Renewal Party) 
Mr. Rui Augusto Ribeiro da Costa 
0.9 1 
AD 
 
Aliança Democrática de Angola (AD-Coligação) 
(Democratic Alliance of Angola) 
Mr. Joao Baptista Vieira Lopes  
0.9 1 
PSD 
 
Partido Social-Democrata  
(Social Democratic Party) 
Mr. Bengui Pedro João 
0.8 1 
PAJOCA 
 
Partido da Aliança da Juventude, Operários e Camponeses de Angola  
(Party of the Alliance of Youth, Workers and Farmers of Angola) 
Mr. Alexandre Sebastião André  
0.4 1 
FDA 
 
Fórum Democrátrico Angolano  
(Angolan Democratic Forum) 
Mr. António Dias da Silva 
0,3 1 
PDP-ANA 
 
Partido Democrático par a o Progresso/Aliança Nacional Angolana  
(Democratic Progress Party/Angolan National Alliance) 
Mr. Mfulumpinga N'lando Victor (deceased) 
0,3 1 
PNDA 
 
Partido Nacional Democrático Angolano  
(Angolan National Democratic Party) 
Mr. Geraldo Pereira da Silva 
0,3 1 
Source: official web-site of the Parliament of Angola (Página Oficial da Assembleia Nacional da 
República de Angola: http://www.parlamento.ao/) 
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Appendix B 
A-IP/CMI 
Institutional development in Angola – The Parliament 
Questionnaire 
 
 
In the scope of the research project “Institutional development in Angola”, having as a study case the national 
Parliament, we ask for and welcome your opinion, as MP, on the following issues, related to parliamentary 
activities in Angola. 
 
 
1 MANDATE and AUTONOMY 
Since 1991 the constitution has formally given the Angolan Parliament more powers, influence and 
responsibilities in the political system. We would like to know your opinion on the formal responsibilities of 
the Parliament of Angola, and your opinion on its ability to make decisions according to its purpose and 
mandate, and to make decisions without undue interference from other institutions in the political system. 
 
a) In your opinion, does the current constitution assign sufficient influence and responsibilities to the 
Parliament? 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament is constitutionally strong and influential 
(  ) Basically, the Parliament is strong according to the constitution although some reforms smaller 
should be made. 
(  ) No, the constitution is not giving sufficient powers to the Parliament. A constitutional reform 
should strengthen the role of the Parliament, in particular by: 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
b) In your opinion, looking at the budget process, does the Parliament have sufficient influence on the 
national budget? 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament has a significant influence on the national budget 
(  ) No, the Parliament does not have sufficient influence on the national budget 
(  ) The parliament has some influence on the budget. The most important budgetary influence 
exercised by the Parliament has been that: 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
c) What is your impression of where the initiative for new laws  is coming from, in general? 
(  ) The initiative for new laws is basically taken by the President or the Government 
(  ) The initiative is taken in general by the Legislative branch (the courts) 
(  ) The initiative is basically taken by the Parliament itself 
(  ) In some important cases, the initiative for new laws has been taken by the Parliament, namely the 
laws of (which, when):  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
d) In your opinion, looking at the legal process in general (the process of formulating and passing 
laws), does the Parliament have sufficient influence? 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament has a significant influence on the law making process 
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(  ) No, the Parliament does not have sufficient influence on the law making process 
 (  ) On the passing of some new laws, the Parliament has had influence (which, when):  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
e) In you opinion, can and does the Parliament check and control the implementation of (new) 
legislation? 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament is checking and controlling that the Government is implementing legislation 
passed, on a sufficient and permanent basis  
(  ) The Parliament is to some extent checking and controlling implementation 
(  ) No, the Parliament rarely checks or controls the implementation of laws 
Additional comments:  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
f) In your opinion, does the President have and use his power of veto? 
(  ) No, the President does not have veto powers 
(  ) Yes, the President has veto powers, but he rarely or never uses his veto powers 
(  ) Yes, the President has and is frequently using his veto powers. These are some important 
examples:  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
g) In your opinion, are there any examples of the President’s office or Government not respecting  the 
decisions taken by the Parliament (by for instance issuing Government decrees contradictory to 
legislation passed by the Parliament, or spending money on purposes not authorised by the 
Parliament through the budget)? 
(  ) Yes, this is common in Angola 
(  ) No, the decisions of the Parliament is generally respected and followed up correctly by the 
President and the Government 
(  ) The President and Government are sometimes disregarding Parliamentary decisions. The 
following are important examples:  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
h) In making nominations to senior government positions  (like in the military and state 
administration, governors and directors of central bank, state companies etc.), does the Parliament in 
your opinion have sufficient influence? 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament has a decisive influence on nominations 
(  ) No, nominations are generally made by the President and Government exclusively  
(  ) In some instances, the President and Government have consulted with and taken the view of the 
Parliament into consideration in nominations. The following are important examples:  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
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i) In establishing special commissions  (non-permanent commissions of control, like for instance an 
Electoral Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission, Human Rights Commission, Anti-Drugs 
Commission); what is the influence of the Parliament? Does the Parliament have an influence on 
having these established, on their mandate and staff, and do they report to the Parliament?  
(  ) Yes, the Parliament has a decisive influence on special commissions 
(  ) No, commissions are generally established by and report only to the President and Government 
(  ) In some instances, the Parliament has established, influenced on the mandate of, and are receiving 
reports from special agencies, like for instance 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
j) In your opinion, does the Parliament of Angola have the power to lift (take away) the immunity of 
the President, Government ministers and members of the Supreme Court, and of impeachment 
towards the executive or judiciary branch? 
(  ) No, the parliament of Angola is not bestowed with this authority 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament has this authority but it has never used it  
(  ) Yes, the Parliament has this authority and has already used it (on what occasion?) 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
k) In your opinion, does the President have the power to lift the immunity of the Members of 
Parliament in Angola?  
(  ) No, the President of Angola is not bestowed with this authority 
(  ) Yes, the President has this authority but it has never used it  
(  ) Yes, the President has this authority and has already used it (on what occasion?) 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
 
2 CAPACITIES  
Not every Parliament in the world has sufficient resources to fulfil all its responsibilities. We would like to 
have your opinion about the resources, capacities, and organisation of the Angolan Parliament. 
 
l) In your opinion, are the budget allocations and financial resources  made available to the Parliament 
sufficient for it to fulfil its responsibilities? 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament is sufficiently resourced 
(  ) No, resources are severely limited, which makes it impossible to do what the Parliament and the 
MPs are supposed to do 
(  ) In some instances, resources have been inadequate to complete certain responsibilities. The 
following are imp ortant examples:  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
m) In your opinion, is the remuneration system of parliamentarians  adequate? Is the pay good enough 
for Members of Parliament to fulfil their duties?  
(  ) Yes, the Members of Parliament are adequately paid to fulfil their duties. 
(  ) No, the pay is generally too limited, which makes it impossible to do what the Parliament and the 
MPs are supposed to do. 
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n) In your opinion, are there substantial fringe benefits  and/or informal payments  made to Members 
of Parliament, with some possible influence on MP’s capacity or their incentives?  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
o) In your opinion, does the Parliament of Angola have a sufficient administration (support staff, 
permanent secretarial staff, including financial and legal expertise, library etc.) in terms of number, 
professional skills, experience, expertise, and outlook? 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament is sufficiently resourced in terms of administrative capacities 
(  ) No, resources are limited and hardly available to Members of Parliament 
(  ) In some instances, administrative resources are too scarce to adequately fulfil certain tasks. The 
following are important examples:  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
p) In your opinion, is the Parliament of Angola well equipped in terms of infrastructure? Does the 
Members of Parliament have access to computers, research, travel, offices and other necessary 
infrastructure? 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament is well equipped 
(  ) No, the parliament is in general inadequately equipped  
(  ) In some areas, the Parliament is insufficiently equipped. In my opinion, the most severe shortages 
are: 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
q) In your opinion, is the Parliament of Angola well organised (does it have an efficient internal 
organisation in terms of its presidency, permanent committees, plenary sessions, and party groups)? 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament is well organised to fulfil its tasks 
(  ) No, the internal organisation is not efficient  
(  ) Some parts of the organisation are inadequate or weak. The following are in my opinion the main 
weaknesses in the Parliament’s organisation: 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
 
r) In your opinion, where are the real political decisions made? In what part  of the Parliament (our 
beyond) are the most important political discussions, considerations and hard decisions taken? 
(  ) Important political decisions are in general taken outside of Parliament 
(  ) By the Government or President’s office 
(  ) By the ruling party 
(  ) By 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
(  ) Important political decisions are to a large extent made in Parliament, and more specifically by  
  (  ) The Parliament’s Presidency 
  (  ) The permanent committees (comissões) 
  (  ) The party groups (Grupos Parlamentares) 
  (  ) Parliament Plenary sessions 
  (  ) Other: ____________________________ 
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s) In your opinion, which are the most important permanent commissions of the Angolan Parliament? 
What commissions are more important and influential? (more than one is possible; please also 
indicate why) 
(  ) 1 Constitutional and legal affairs (Assuntos Constitucionais e Jurídicos Regimentos e Mandato) 
(  ) 2 Defence, security and internal order (Defesa, Segurança e Ordem Interna) 
(  ) 3 Foreign relations, international co-operation and Angolan communities abroad (Relações 
Exteriores, Cooperação Internacional e Comunidades Angolanas no Estrangeiro) 
(  ) 4 Local administration and local authorities (Administração e Poder Local) 
(  ) 5 Economy and finance (Económia e Finanças) 
(  ) 6 Education, science, culture, religious affairs, sports and media (Educação, Ciência, Cultura, 
Assuntos Religiosos, Desporto e Comunicação Social) 
(  ) 7 Health, environment, social affairs and war weterans (Saúde, Meio Ambiente, Acção Social 
Emprego e Antigos Combatentes) 
(  ) 8 Parliamentary mandate, ethics and form (Mandatos, Ética e Decoro Parlamentar) 
(  ) 9 Human rights and citizen petitions, complaints and suggestions (Direitos Humanos, Petições, 
Reclamações e Sugestões dos Cidadãos). 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
t) In your opinion, does the Members of Parliament of Angola have a ‘pride’ in the institution, do they 
show loyalty and respect to the Parliament as an institution, and do they in general take part in its 
work with a positive, constructive attitude?  
(  ) Yes, pride and respect is the general attitude of the Members of Parliament 
(  ) No, in general the parliamentarians hold little respect and pride in the institution 
(  ) The question cannot be answered in simple terms. In some cases, there is a lack of respect or lack 
of pride. In my opinion, the problems are: 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
u) In your opinion, would you say that the Party Groups  (Grupos Parlamentares) and the political 
parties represented in Parliament are well organised, coherent and influential?  
(  ) Yes, the parties represented and the party groups are well organised 
(  ) No, the parties and party groups are in general weak, fragmented and have little influence 
(  ) Some of the parties and party groups are well organised, others are not. In my opinion, the well 
organised and influential are: 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
v) In your opinion, would you say that party discipline is strong in Angola? Are individual Members of 
Parliament in general respecting and following up decisions made by their party (party group)?  
(  ) Yes, party discipline is strong in Angola. This is because: 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________ 
 
(  ) No, party discipline is weak in Angola. This is because: 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________ 
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3 REPRESENTATIVITY and LEGITIMACY 
One basic purpose of a parliament is to represent all segments of a society. Now we would like to have your 
opinion in the Angolan Parliament’s representativity, and also your opinion on aspects of its legitimacy; how 
you think it is regarded by people outside of the Parliament.  
 
w) In your opinion, would you say that the Parliament as such is representing Angolan society well? 
Are all parts of society (ethnic, religious, regional, gender, age, class, political ideologies) 
represented, and represented according to their numbers in society? 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament is quite representative of the Angolan society 
(  ) No, some segments of society are over-represented in Parliament, and others are severely under-
represented. These are basically:  
(  ) Over-represented: 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
(  ) Under-represented: 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
 
x) In your opinion, would you say that the Parliament of Angola is legitimate? Do you think that 
people’s opinion about the Parliament is favourable, and that the Parliament is well respected? 
(  ) Yes, the Parliament is legitimate and in general well respected 
(  ) No, there are severe lacks in terms of its legitimacy and respect 
(  ) Some segments of society are not respecting the Parliament. These are basically:  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
y) In your opinion and experience, do interest groups in society address the Parliament directly? Is there 
lobbyism taking place in the Angolan Parliament? Are certain groups (businesses, interest groups, 
NGOs, etc.) taking contact with Members of Parliament, the Parliament in general or parliament 
committees directly, and on their own initiative, to voice their opinions? 
(  ) Yes, lobbyism takes place frequently 
(  ) No, lobbyism does not take place in Angola 
(  ) Some groups have taken direct contact to express their concerns and opinions, namely (who, and 
possibly when and for what purpose): 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
z) In your opinion, is the media coverage of the activities of the Parliament good? Are state and private 
media sufficiently interested in the work done by the Parliament, and are they adequately reporting 
what is important? 
(  ) Yes, the media coverage of parliamentary activities is good 
(  ) No, media coverage of parliamentary activities is in general very insufficient 
(  ) Some media have a stronger interest and better coverage. These are for instance:  
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
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